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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature oftlze Case 
This is a false confession case that has been extensively litigated and has been the subject 
of national media coverage. 1 This appeal is from the summary dismissal of a successive post-
conviction petition. The issue in this case is whether Christopher Tapp was deprived of his right 
to testify at the criminal trial. As explained below, the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing the successive petition. 
B. Prior Proceedings 
Mr. Tapp was convicted of the first-degree murder and rape of Angie Dodge after a jury 
trial. He was sentenced to a life sentence, plus fifteen years, with 30 years fixed on the murder 
charge. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that some of Mr. Tapp's statements to the police 
should have been suppressed, but that the error in admitting the illegally obtained statements was 
harmless in light of the legally obtained admissions. State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 357-58, 33 
P.3d 828, 831-32 (Ct. App. 2001) review denied ("Tapp I"). 
Mr. Tapp filed a prose verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. CR (#35536) 8.2 He 
alleged six different causes of action. CR (#35536) 9. As to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Mr. Tapp'spra se petition alleged, inter alia, that: 
(g) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to call 
1 NBC Dateline, "The Confession," (First aired August 24, 2012) (available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/dateline/48786251 #48786251 ). 
2 This Court has taken judicial notice of the files and records in the criminal case. State 
v. Tapp, Docket No. 25295 (Bonneville Co. No. CR-1997-481) ("Tapp I"). It has also taken 
judicial notice of the original post-conviction case and proceedings upon remand. Tapp v. State, 
Docket Nos. 35536 and 40197) (Bonneville Co. No. CV-02-6009) ("Tapp II" and "Tapp III''). 
me as a witness in my case, (this request by me came during trial), in which my 
testimony should have been heard by a jury of my peers. 
CR (#35536) 11. 
The district court summarily dismissed the petition and a timely notice of appeal was 
filed. CR (#35536) 161,224. 
On appeal, Mr. Tapp argued that the district court erred by dismissing his right to testify 
claim. On March 4, 2009, fearing that the issue had not been adequately raised by original post-
conviction counsel, Mr. Tapp filed a Verified Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. CR 4. 
The successive petition specifically alleged "trial counsel refused to permit petitioner to testify at 
the criminal trial even though petitioner specifically asked to testify" and argued that his right to 
testify was violated. CR 5, 6-7. 
After the successive petition was filed, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished 
decision in the first post-conviction appeal. As feared, the Court of Appeals refused to consider 
the claim that Mr. Tapp had been deprived of his right to testify: 
Tapp argues, for the first time on appeal, that this claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to call him as a witness should have been analyzed by the 
district court, not just as an instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, but also 
as a direct violation of his right to testify .... Generally, issues not raised below 
may not be considered for the first time on appeal. Tapp not only pled the issue as 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but presented the issue as an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
Tapp II, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 412 (Ct. App., March 31, 2010), pg. 12. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed in part, but also reversed in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 
two issues. Id, pg. 18. 
Upon remand, the district court summarily dismissed one of the remanded issues and 
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denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing on the other issue. Mr. Tapp appealed. 
That case is currently pending and is set for oral argument on November 12, 2013. Tapp III. 
C. Course of Successive Post-Conviction Petition Proceedings 
The successive petition at issue here was filed while the first appeal in the first post-
conviction case was pending. The state filed a Motion to Dismiss wherein it asked the Court to 
take "judicial notice of the prior petition and proceedings in Bonneville County Case No. CV-02-
6009." CR 12. It also filed an Answer. CR 15-16. Mr. Tapp filed a Joinder in the State's 
Request that Court Take Judicial Notice of the Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings and Request 
that it Take Judicial Notice of the Prior Criminal Case. CR 29. The district court took judicial 
notice of the files and records in Tapp I, II and III CR 74. 
In support of the successive petition, Mr. Tapp filed his affidavit. It alleged, in part, as 
follows: 
4. I did not testify at my trial, although I wanted to, because Mr. Booker refused 
to allow me to do so. 
5. I alleged in the first petition as follows: "Trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel when he failed to call me as a witness in my cases, (this 
request by me came during trial), in which my testimony should have been heard 
by a jury of my peers." 
6. I also filed affidavits during the proceedings on the first petition where I 
alleged "[t]hat during the trial I requested to take the stand in my own defense" 
and "[t]hat I requested numerous times to take the stand during this trial, Mr. 
Booker continued to tell me that I was not competent enough to take the stand[.]") 
7. It wasn't until the trial that Mr. Booker told me he had decided I would not testify. 
From the time of the preliminary hearing until that moment, I believed I would testify. 
8. I did not voluntarily agree to not testify due to Mr. Booker's advice. I did not 
know that I had the right to testify even if Mr. Booker didn't want me to testify 
and believed it was his decision to make. 
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9. If I had known that I had the final say on the question, I would have testified 
because I knew I had to tell the jury that things I said on the tapes were not true 
and that I had been manipulated into saying those things. 
CR 59-60. 
The court denied the state's motion for summary dismissal. However, the court sua 
sponte raised the issue of whether the deprivation of the right to testify claim "should be 
summarily dismissed under a Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] analysis." CR 86. 
Mr. Tapp filed a Response to the Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss arguing that: 1) 
Chapman puts the burden of proving that the deprivation of the right to testify was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt on the state and 2) that the state could not meet that burden. CR 88-
96. Mr. Tapp referred to his testimony during the evidentiary hearing upon remand in Tapp III 
and asked the district court to take judicial notice of that transcript. CR 99. Mr. Tapp filed a 
second affidavit where he alleged, in part, that: 
3. I did not testify at my trial, although I wanted to, because my attorney, Mr. 
Booker, refused to allow me to do so. 
4. Ifl had been called to testify in my criminal trial I could have testified to 
everything I testified to at my evidentiary hearing in CV-2002-6009. 
5. In addition, I would have testified in support of my alibi defense at trial. In 
particular I would have testified that I was at a party at Jason Hope's home at 725 
Saturn,# 9 in Idaho Falls from about 7:00 p.m. on June 12, 1996 until about 11 :00 
p.m. I left Mr. Hope's home with Britney Morgan and we spent the night together 
at the apartment that I was sharing with Jeff Blackburn. I did not leave my 
apartment until after Ms. Morgan left around 10:00 a.m. on June 13, 1996. 
CR 101-102. 
The state's response to the Court's Order, argued that Mr. Tapp's testimony would not 
have been deemed to be credible at the criminal trial. CR 107-108. It also argued, for the first 
4 
time, that there was no deprivation of Mr. Tapp's right to testify. It noted that Mr. Booker had 
testified at the evidentiary hearing in Tapp Ill that Mr. Tapp "was adamantly opposed to 
testifying. Now, that's relative particularly to trial." CR 106 (quoting evidentiary hearing 
testimony, pg. 162-163). 
Mr. Tapp objected to the state raising the issue of whether there had been a deprivation of 
the right to testify when neither its motion to dismiss (which had already been denied) nor the 
court's notice of intent to dismiss raised that issue. CR 135. It also argued that Mr. Booker's 
testimony was oflittle value given the context in which it was made, was not subject to cross-
examination, and that, in any case, the court was required to liberally construe the facts and make 
all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Tapp on summary disposition. CR 136. Finally, Mr. 
Tapp responded to the state's contention that the error was harmless. CR 89-96. 
The court, in its decision, claimed that it had "raised the issues of (1) whether Tapp 
voluntarily waived his right to testify, and if not, (2) was the failure to testify harmless error." 
CR 123. It went on to conclude that there was a presumption that Mr. Tapp did not want to 
testify because he had not made an objection during the criminal trial and that he had not 
overcome that presumption. CR 129. It also concluded "that there is no reasonable doubt that 
had Tapp testified at the time of trial, such testimony would not have altered the jury's 
conclusion as to his guilt." In doing so, it refused to consider the portions of Mr. Tapps 
affidavits relating to his alibi defense. CR 132. The court then summarily dismissed the 
successive petition. CR 133. 
Mr. Tapp filed a timely notice of appeal. CR 149. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the court err because it dismissed the case on a ground, i.e., that Mr. Tapp's right 
to testify had not been violated, different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss? 
B. Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised by the court, did the court err by creating 
a new legal presumption that Mr. Tapp waived his right to testify by his silence at trial and then 
resolving the factual issue against him during the summary disposition proceedings by applying 
that presumption? 
C. Did the court err because it dismissed a portion of the case on a ground, i.e., that Mr. 
Tapp was barred from raising the alibi testimony issue because he could have raised it in his first 
petition, different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss? 
D. Assuming arguendo that issue was raised by the court, did the court err by finding the 
issue should have been raised in the first petition? 
E. Did the court err in concluding that any deprivation of the right to testify was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Erred by Dismissing the Case on a Ground Different Than That Raised in 
its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, to Wit: Mr. Tapp Was Not Deprived of His Rig/it to 
Testify 
1. The court dismissed on a ground not raised in its notice of intent to dismiss 
At the end of the court's Memorandum and Order denying the state's motion to dismiss, 
it gave the following sua sponte notice of intent to dismiss: 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court does not find grounds at this time to 
summarily dismiss the petition in this matter. While the State in its motion may 
have intended to assert that the evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of the 
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right to testify and/or that the failure to testify was harmless error, it is the Court's 
opinion that the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on notice, 
nor does the Court believe that those issues have been fully addressed. Therefore, 
the Court on its own motion now raises the issue of whether this matter should be 
summarily dismissed under a Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] 
analysis[.] 
.... [block quotation omitted] 
As to the Court's motion, Tapp shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this 
order to respond to this issue. The State shall then have twenty (20) days to 
respond. Tapp shall then have (15) [sic] days to reply. 
CR86. 
Mr. Tapp filed a timely response and argued why the presumed error was not harmless 
under Chapman, supra. CR 88-96. He also presented a Second Affidavit wherein he explained 
what he would have testified to at the trial. CR 101-102. 
The state's response addressed the harmless error issue, CR 107-108, but also argued that 
there was no deprivation of Mr. Tapp's right to testify, an issue which was not raised in the 
Court's notice of intent. CR 106-107. Mr. Tapp objected to the introduction of the new issue in 
his reply brief. He argued that the state's "argument should be rejected because that is not the 
basis for dismissal for which the Court gave notice. The state's suggestion is not in response to 
the Court's Order of February 20 and is logically irrelevant to the precise issue before the Court." 
CR 135. He continued: 
In addition, the state's suggestion should be rejected because Mr. Tapp is entitled 
by due process and LC.§ 19-4906(b) to at least 20 days notice of the basis for the 
court's intended dismissal. The Supreme Court has written: "If the district court 
decides to dismiss the application, LC. § 19-4906(b) requires the court to notify 
the parties of its intention and give the petitioner an opportunity to respond; 
failure to do so requires reversal of a judgment denying the application for 
post-conviction relief." Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 
795, 797 (1995). Thus, the state cannot raise a new issue within the context of the 
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court's sua sponte notice. If the state wanted to move for summary dismissal on 
that basis it should have done so in its prior motion instead of raising an entirely 
different theory for the first time in a responsive brief. The state's suggestion 
made in its response to the Court's notice is not a proper motion and should not be 
acted upon. Saykhamchone, supra. 
CR 135. 
The district court issued an order dismissing the petition because Mr. Tapp had not shown 
that he was deprived of the right to testify. The court did not directly address Mr. Tapp's 
objection to the state's improper argument, but instead asserted that it had "raised the issues of 
(1) whether Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify, and if not, (2) was the failure to testify 
harmless error" in its notice of intent to dismiss. CR 123. However, as demonstrated by the 
quote from the court's notice of intent above, the court never raised the issue of whether Mr. 
Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify. To the contrary, the court found that "[w]hile the 
State in its motion may have intended to assert that the evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of 
the right to testify ... the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on notice .... " 
It then gave notice to dismiss on the harmless error question only: "Therefore, the Court on its 
own motion now raises the issue of whether this matter should be summarily dismissed under a 
Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] analysis[.]" CR 86. 
Thus the court dismissed the petition on a ground which was not raised in its notice of 
intent to dismiss, i.e. "that Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify at the time of trial." CR 
129. Accordingly, as will be explained below, the portion of the decision dismissing the petition 
on this basis should be vacated. 
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2. The first reason for summary dismissal should be reversed because the district 
court did not comply with I.C. § 19-4906(b) 
The district court violated I.C. § 19-4906(b) when it dismissed petition for post-
conviction relief on a ground not set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. 
2009): 
The applicable law is set out in Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b ), the district court may sua sponte dismiss an 
applicant's post-conviction claims if the court provides the applicant with notice 
of its intent to do so, the ground or grounds upon which the claim is to be 
dismissed, and twenty days for the applicant to respond. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906(c), if the state files and serves a properly supported motion to dismiss, 
further notice :from the court is ordinarily unnecessary. Saykhamchone v. State, 
127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). The reason that subsection (b), 
but not section ( c ), requires a twenty-day notice by the court of intent to dismiss is 
that, under subsection ( c ), the motion itself serves as notice that summary 
dismissal is being sought. Id. 
147 Idaho at 517,211 P.3d at 126 (footnotes omitted). See also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 
523,236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010) ("Thus, where a trial court dismisses a claim based upon 
grounds other than those offered- by the State's motion for summary dismissal, and 
accompanying memoranda - the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with 
a 20-day notice period.") 
The twenty-day notice period is also required by due process. The due process guarantees 
under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution both provide protections against 
deprivations oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,115,666 P.2d 639,642 (1983). 
"Procedural due process, as it is guaranteed under both the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions, requires 
that a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful 
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opportunity to be heard." State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542,544, 211 P.3d 787, 789 (Ct. App. 2009) 
citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343, 
160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2007) ("procedural due process requires an opportunity to be 
heard"). 
The court's notice here can only be understood to relate to the harmless error aspect of 
Chapman. The substantive federal claim in Chapman was that the defendant's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right to remain silent was violated. The California Supreme Court found 
there was a constitutional violation but "nevertheless affirmed, applying the State Constitution's 
harmless-error provision, which forbids reversal unless 'the court shall be of the opinion that the 
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'" The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari limited to these questions: "Where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, (1) can the error be held to be 
harmless, and (2) if so, was the error harmless in this case?" Chapman v. California, 386 U.S., at 
20. Thus, the only issue in Chapman was the harmless error question and the district court's 
reference to "a Chapman analysis" could only mean that Mr. Tapp should address the question of 
whether the constitutional error in his case can be deemed to be harmless under Chapman. As 
the constitutional violation found in Chapman was a violation of the right to remain silent, id., 
that case has no other application to Mr. Tapp's right to testify claim. 
Here, the court's sua sponte order of dismissal on a ground not set forth in its notice of 
intent to dismiss violated both the statutory and due process rights to fair notice and an 
opportunity to respond. This Court should vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. 
Bussv. State,supra; I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
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3. The state raising the issue for the first time in its response to the court's notice of 
intent to dismiss was not a proper motion for summary dismissal on its part and 
the argument should not have been considered 
The district court also should not have dismissed the case based upon a new argument 
first raised by the state in response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. The 
Supreme Court has written: "If the district court decides to dismiss the application, I.C. § 
19-4906(b) requires the court to notify the parties of its intention and give the petitioner an 
opportunity to respond; failure to do so requires reversal of a judgment denying the application 
for post-conviction relief." Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho at 321, 900 P.2d at 797. 
In Saykhamchone, the state filed an answer to the petition and asked the court to 
summarily dismiss the petition in its prayer for relief. The district court, without giving prior 
notice, issued an order dismissing the petition. On appeal, Saykhamchone argued that the district 
court did not give notice under I.C. § 19-4906(b ). The state argued that the court was not 
required to give notice because it had requested summary dismissal in its prayer for relief. The 
Court rejected this reasoning as follows: 
The state correctly argues that no twenty-day notice is required under subsection 
( c) when the court grants a motion for summary disposition. The state's 
contention might be dispositive, of course, if the state had ever filed a motion for 
summary disposition ..... 
LR. C.P. 7 (b )(1) provides that motions, unless made during trial or hearing, [ 1] 
"shall be in writing, [2] shall state with particularity the grounds therefor 
including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed, 
and [3] shall set forth the relief or order sought." Here, the better practice would 
have been for the state to file a separate motion under subsection ( c ). But at a 
minimum, the state's prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient for not stating 
its grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for 
summary disposition under LC. § 19-4906( c ). 
127 Idaho at 322, 900 P.2d at 798 (internal citations and emphasis omitted); compare State v. 
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Workman, 144 Idaho 518,524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007)3 
Similarly here, the state never argued in its motion for summary dismissal (which was 
denied by the court in any case) that, according to Mr. Booker, Mr. Tapp did not want to testify. 
Nor did it file a second motion for summary dismissal raising that issue. Thus, its argument 
made in response to the court's sua sponte notice was not sufficient to be fairly considered as a 
motion under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) and the petition should not have been dismissed on that basis. 
4. Even if the state's argument could be considered a second motion for summary 
dismissal, the court erred by dismissing the petition without giving Mr. Tapp 
twenty days to respond 
Under the court's scheduling order, Mr. Tapp was given 15 days after the filing of the 
state's response to file a reply brief. CR 86. Thus, even if the state's argument could be 
considered to be a proper motion, the court erred by dismissing the case without first giving Mr. 
Tapp twenty-days notice and the same time to respond. As the Saykhamchone Court wrote: 
"After a state files a subsection ( c) motion, a petitioner is still entitled to twenty days to respond, 
so as to afford an opportunity to establish a material fact issue." Id, citing State v. Christensen, 
102 Idaho 487,488,632 P.2d 676,677 (1981). 
The state cannot raise a new issue within the context of the court's sua sponte notice and 
have it be considered a motion under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). If the state wanted to move to summary 
dismissal on that basis it should have done so in its prior motion or it should have filed a second 
3 In Workman, the state filed a separate motion to dismiss along with twenty-two pages 
of argument. Still the Supreme Court wrote that "[w]hile we conclude the State's answer and 
motion to dismiss were technically sufficient under I.C. § 19-4906( c) and Saykhamchone, we 
reiterate our direction in Saykhamchone that the preferable practice is: (1) to file a motion 
separate from the answer; (2) to identify that motion as a motion for summary disposition, not a 
motion to dismiss, and (3) to use the language of I.C. § 19-4906( c) and cite to that specific 
statutory provision in support of the motion for summary disposition." Id. 
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motion. Further, the court never gave Mr. Tapp notice that it intended to treat the state's 
suggestion as a motion and then give the required twenty days to respond. As Mr. Tapp received 
no notice that the issue was before the court upon summary disposition, the argument should not 
have be acted upon. Saykhamchone, supra. But, even if the state's new argument could be 
considered a motion for summary disposition, the court erred by not giving Mr. Tapp twenty days 
to respond. Id 
B. Alternatively, the Question of Whether Mr. Tapp Validly Waived His Right to Testify is 
a Material Issue of Fact and the Trial Court Erred by Resolving a Factual Issue 
Against Mr. Tapp During the Summary Disposition Proceedings 
1. Introduction 
The district court erred in dismissing the case based upon its conclusion that Mr. Tapp 
had validly waived his right to testify when there was still a genuine question of fact on that 
issue. "In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, a court 
must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, and determine whether they 
would entitle petitioner to relief if true." Saykhamchone, supra; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 
153, 177 P.3d 362, 367 (2007). Summary disposition may be granted only if the petitioner's 
evidence, based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file, 
raises no genuine issue of material fact. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 
(2010). 
2. Mr. Tapp was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue 
Mr. Booker, at the evidentiary hearing in No. 40197 was asked why Mr. Tapp did not 
testify at the suppression hearing. He said that "Christopher expressed on a number of occasions 
that he was fearful of taking the stand because he had been manipulated so successfully ... Now, 
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that was relative particularly to trial." T (#40197) pg. 171, ln. 21 - pg. 172, ln. 7.4 However, Mr. 
Tapp, as set out at pages 3-5 above, alleged under oath that Mr. Booker did not permit him to 
testify even though he told Mr. Booker that he wanted to do so. CR 59-61; 101-102. Taking Mr. 
Tapp's allegations in the most favorable light to him, there is a question of material fact as to 
whether that was the case, even taking Mr. Booker's comment into consideration. 
Mr. Tapp is aware that the Court of Appeals stated in Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 195 
P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2008), that 
because the trial court, rather than a jury, will be the trier of fact in the event of an 
evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008). That is, the judge in a post-conviction 
action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable 
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id. 
Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.3d at 714. However, Hayes does not apply here because 
the district court was not drawing an adverse inference against Mr. Tapp based upon 
"uncontroverted evidentiary facts." It simply chose to believe Mr. Booker's non-responsive 
answer to a question about testimony at the suppression hearing instead of Mr. Tapp's directly 
contrary affidavit. Hayes does not permit the court to resolve the sort of controverted issue of 
material fact present here and consequently the general rule as stated in Saykhamchone and 
Baldwin applies.5 Applying the correct standard, it is clear that there is a genuine issue of 
4 Mr. Tapp was represented by attorney John Thomas at that hearing. Counsel for Mr. 
Tapp in this case was not present at that hearing. 
5 This is made clear by Hayes' citation to State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 
(2008) as authority for the above quoted material. In Yakovic, the Supreme Court stated, 
"[W]here the evidentiary facts are not in dispute ... summary judgment is appropriate, despite 
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material fact over whether Mr. Tapp validly waived his right to testify and the court should have 
granted an evidentiary hearing on that issue. 
Moreover, even if the court were allowed to weigh conflicting evidence, it still reached 
the wrong conclusion. While Mr. Booker made an offhanded comment about trial proceedings 
during his testimony at the 2002 post-conviction hearing, the question put to him was about why 
Mr. Tapp did not testify at the motion to suppress hearing. CR 106; T (#40197), pg. 171, In. 24 -
172, In. 10. And of note, Mr. Booker's testimony was only that Mr. Tapp was fearful of 
testifying, not that he wanted to waive his right to testify following advice that he had a absoulte 
right to do so. Being fearful is not the equivalent to a voluntary waiver of a known right. 
Further, Mr. Booker was not cross-examined about his recollection regarding Mr. Tapp not 
testifying at the trial, presumably because it was not relevant to the matter at hand. So it was not 
made clear to the district court what Mr. Booker's complete recollection about the issue here 
actually was. Nor has that complete recollection been tested by cross-examination. Finally, the 
state never filed an affidavit from Mr. Booker or from co-counsel or from local counsel to 
controvert Mr. Tapp's allegation that Mr. Booker did not allow him to testify. In light of the 
evidence before the court, it erred in concluding that Mr. Tapp validly waived his right to testify. 
Moreover, the trial court did not construe the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Tapp. Instead, it held as a matter oflaw that: 
Tapp's silence at the time of trial [regarding not being called to testify] at the very 
the possibility of conflicting inferences ... " 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483, quoting Riverside 
Development v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982) (emphasis added). It also 
stated that the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences "to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Id, quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 
P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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least creates a presumption that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
testify. Tapp's belated testimony alone in post-conviction proceedings that he 
wanted to testify is insufficient to rebut the presumption. Based upon the 
foregoing, the Court finds that Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify at the 
time of trial. 
CR 129. However, there is no such "presumption" in the state ofldaho. 
The well-established and long-standing law regarding the evaluation of conflicting 
evidence during summary disposition proceedings in Idaho is expressed in Saykhamchone, 
Baldwin and Kelly. And, there is no Idaho case regarding a Sixth Amendment right to testify 
claim which has deviated from those standards. See, Aragon v. State, 144 Idaho 758, 763, 760 
P.3d 1174, 1179 (1988) (Court finds no violation of right to testify based upon testimony of trial 
attorney at hearing where he was subject to cross-examination.); and DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 
599, 604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1153 (2009) ("Because DeRushe alleged admissible facts showing that 
his counsel denied him the right to testify in his own behalf, we vacate the dismissal of this 
claim[.]") 
In creating this "presumption" the court relied on some cases from the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal. CR 124-128. However, while the precedent of the United States 
Supreme Court is binding upon the Idaho Supreme Court, V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 
134 Idaho 716, 719, 9 P.3d 716 (2000), the same is not true of the Federal Circuit or District 
Courts. See State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 76,685 P.2d 814,817 (1984) (federal district court). 
None of the cases cited by the district court are binding on this Court and furthermore are 
inconsistent with the rule as announced by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the presumption applied by the district court does not even find complete 
acceptance within the federal system. See, Gallego v. United States, 174 F.3d 1196. 1198 (I 1th 
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Cir. 1999) ("The fact that defendant's testimony is uncorroborated is not enough standing alone 
to support a credibility finding" that would render an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. 
"Counsel's testimony was also unsubstantiated by other evidence.") Furthermore, it is 
inconsistent with long-standing United States Supreme Court precedent that a waiver of an 
important constitutional right will not be presumed from a silent record. To the contrary, the 
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977). 
Under the proper standard for reviewing evidence at this point in the proceedings, the trial 
court erred in resolving a disputed question of material fact against Mr. Tapp and that portion of 
the order should be reversed. 
C. The Court Erred by Partially Dismissing the Case on a Ground Different Than That 
Raised in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, to Wit: Mr. Tapp Was Barred From Raising 
His Claim Regarding Not Being Allowed to Testify in Support of an Alibi Defense 
1. Introduction 
The district court also found the deprivation of the right to testify was harmless. CR 133. 
In reaching that conclusion, it refused to consider any of Mr. Tapp's allegations regarding his 
alibi defense because: 
Tapp in his first Petition did not raise any issue regarding an alibi defense. To the 
extent Tapp had a valid alibi defense which wasn't pursued by defense counsel, 
such should have been raised in the first Petition. 
"LC. § 19-2719 places a heightened burden on a petitioner which 
requires a prima facie showing by petitioner that the issues raised 
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were not known and could not have been known within 42 days of 
judgment." Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 
(1993). Even when the required prima facie showing is made, the 
issues must still be asserted "within a reasonable time" after they 
are known or reasonably could have been known. Id. A court 
must summarily dismiss any successive petition that does not meet 
the requirements ofl.C. § 19-2719(5). I.C. § 19-2719(11). 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 701, 992 P.2d 144, 150 (1999). 
Accordingly, allegations of an alibi defense will not be considered. The failure to 
raise the alibi allegations as ineffective assistance of counsel and/or a 
constitutional violation in the first Petition preclude the consideration of alibi 
allegations in this successive petition. 
LCR 131. The court erred by so ruling because it did not raise this argument in its notice of 
intent to dismiss. CR 86. The only issue raised by the court was whether the "matter should be 
summarily dismissed under a Chapman analysis." Id. Thus, Mr. Tapp was never given notice 
that the court was considering partially dismissing the claim under I.C. § 19-2719(5), and 
consequently never had a chance to respond to it. As argued at length above, both I.C. § 
19-4906(b) and Saykhamchone v. State, supra, require the court to notify the parties of its intent 
to dismiss and the basis thereof, and give the petitioner an opportunity to respond. 
Not only did the district court fail to give notice that it intended to partially dismiss the 
petition as an improper successive petition, it had previously rejected the state's argument that 
the successive petition was not properly filed. CR 84 ("Tapp has presented sufficient/prima facie 
evidence to the effect that counsel in the original petition were ineffective for failing to raise that 
issue. As such, the Court declines to dismiss the second petition as being an impermissible 
successive petition under§ 19-4908.") Thus, Mr. Tapp had absolutely no reason to suspect that 
the court intended to summary dismiss the alibi testimony claim as improperly raised in a 
successive petition. 
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In light of the court's utter failure to give any advance notice of its intent to partially 
dismiss on that basis, this Court should vacate the order under both I.C. § 19--4906(b) and 
Saykhamchone, supra. 
D. Alternatively, the Court Erred in Dismissing the Alibi Claim as Mr. Tapp Was Not 
Barred From Raising That Claim in a Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
1. The court should have considered the alibi evidence 
In refusing to consider Mr. Tapp's affidavit regarding his alibi evidence, the court said, 
"To the extent Tapp had a valid alibi defense which wasn't pursued by defense counsel, such 
should have been raised in the first Petition." LCR 131. Mr. Tapp, however, could not have 
raised such a claim because alibi was the defense at trial. Obviously then, Mr. Tapp could not 
have made a claim on ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure to put on that 
defense. And more to the point, Mr. Tapp's affidavit regarding his alibi defense was offered to 
show why the violation of his right to testify had a substantial and injurious effect on his trial. 
Thus, the court should have considered Mr. Tapp's affidavit in this case. 
Moreover, the court's reliance upon McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 701, 992 P.2d 
144, 150 (1999), is misplaced. McKinney was a capital case. Capital cases are subject to the 
special appellate and post-conviction procedure found in I.C. § 19-2719. Successive post-
conviction proceedings in capital cases are governed by subsection (5) thereof. That subsection 
places severe restrictions on the filing of successive post-conviction petitions in capital cases. 
However, non-capital post-conviction petitions, like this one, are governed by LC.§ 19- 4901 et. 
seq., and successive petitions in non-capital cases are governed by the rules found in LC.§ 19-
4908. 
This successive petition was properly filed under LC. § 19-4908. That statute specifically 
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allows a petitioner to file a successive petition if "the court finds a ground for relief asserted 
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application." Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
have found that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can be "sufficient reason" 
for the court to consider the claims raised in a successive petition. Palmer v. Dermitt, l 02 Idaho 
591,635 P.2d 955 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,798,992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 
1999). See Martinez v. Ryan, -U.S.-, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316-18 (2012) (equitable relief from 
the failure to present issues in state post-conviction may be available in federal habeas corpus 
when the failure was due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel). Here, it was 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to fail to properly raise the right to testify claim. 
In the original petition for post-conviction relief (Tapp 11), Mr. Tapp was represented by 
attorney John Stosich. (Prior to Mr. Stosich appearing, Mr. Tapp was represented by Jordan 
Crane, Neal Randall, Jeromy Stafford and Rocky Wixom, all attorneys from the Bonneville 
Public Defender's Office.) One of the facts alleged by Mr. Tapp was that he was not permitted to 
testify at trial contrary to his request to his attorney. The district court construed this claim as a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, found that the trial 
counsel's decision did not prejudice petitioner because it was not reasonably probable that any 
such testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial, and summarily dismissed the post-
conviction petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Tapp II, supra. However, all post-
conviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this claim as a right to testify claim instead 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Mr. Tapp provided the district court with the affidavits of Jordan Crane, John Stosich, 
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Neal Randall and Jeromy Stafford. All of them stated that the failure to raise the direct claim 
was inadvertent and not a strategic decision. CR 38-45; 63-65. Rocky Wixom stated in his 
affidavit that he does not have a specific recollection of the issue being discussed with Mr. Tapp, 
but that he "seriously doubt[s]" he "ever intended to waive that claim." CR 33. The affidavit of 
attorney Andrew Parnes stated that there would be no strategic reason to omit the issue. CR 47.6 
Finally, the second affidavit of Mr. Tapp shows that he was never consulted about the 
issue and never intentionally waived the issue. CR 60-61. In light of the absence of a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary waiver of the direct right to testify issue and because post-conviction 
counsel did not effectively present the claim in the original petition, there was "sufficient reason" 
under I.C. § 19-4908 and Palmer v. Dermitt to permit Mr. Tapp to raise the issue in the 
successive petition. 
In sum, while the district court was correct in rejecting the state's argument that the 
successive petition was improperly filed, CR 84, it erred in partially dismissing on that same 
basis. 
2. The alibi evidence was corroborated by the testimony at trial 
The court also refused to consider the alibi evidence because "such uncorroborated and 
6 Mr. Parnes is a graduate of Williams College (B.A.), Stanford University (Ph.D) and 
Boalt Hall at the University of California at Berkeley (J.D.). He is AV rated by Martindale-
Hubbell, has been named one of the "Best Lawyers in America," and served as President of the 
Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. He said, "[t]here would not be a strategic 
reason for post-conviction counsel to fail to raise the direct right to testify claim in addition to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim." In addition, "[r ]aising a direct right to testify claim 
would have benefitted Mr. Tapp because once a violation of the right to testify is established the 
less demanding Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error test applies. An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland requires the Petitioner to prove he was 
prejudiced, while Chapman requires the State to prove the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 692, 778 P.2d 81, 814 (Ct. App. 1989)." 
21 
self-serving assertions should not be allowed to forestall a summary dismissal .... The only 
evidence in this case is the single assertion by Tapp that he could have testified that he was 
somewhere else at the time of the crime. There is no evidence from any other source that would 
confirm or support Tapp's assertion." LCR 131-132. Findings of fact will be upheld on review 
if "they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record[.]" Herrera v. Estay, 
146 Idaho 674, 678-79, 201 P.3d 647, 651-52 (2009). 
In this case, the court's finding cannot be upheld because there was ample evidence to 
corroborate Mr. Tapp's alibi defense. Jason Hope testified at trial that Mr. Tapp was at his house 
on June 12, 1996, from about 6:00 - 7:00 p.m. to 10:30 - 11:00 p.m. T (No. 25295) pg. 1416, ln. 
17 - pg. 1419, ln. 23. Mr. Hope saw Mr. Tapp leave with Britney Morgan. Id, pg. 1420, ln. 1-23. 
Britney Morgan testified that she and Mr. Tapp were at a party at Jason Hope's house. 
Mr. Tapp arrived at about 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., and they left there together. T (No. 25295) Id, pg. 
1440, ln. 6 - pg. 1442, ln. 1. They went to a bar on Broadway, stayed there for a short time and 
then went to the apartment that Mr. Tapp and Jeff Blackburn shared. Id., pg. 1442, ln. 4 - pg. 
1443, ln. 23. They arrived at the apartment around 11:00 p.m. Id, pg. 1444, ln. 1-3. (While 
Detective Grimes spoke to her prior to trial and tried to suggest that she and Mr. Tapp arrived at 
the apartment around 2:00 or 3:00, she continued to believe it was earlier. Id, pg. 1446, ln. 1-15.) 
Mr. Blackburn was at the apartment when they arrived. Id, pg. 1447, ln. 4-19. That was the only 
time she spent the night at the apartment. Id, pg. 1447, ln. 25 - pg. 1448, ln. 5. She spent the 
entire night there with Mr. Tapp and did not leave until 10:00 a.m., the next day. 
Mr. Tapp's roommate, Jeff Blackburn, testified that Mr. Tapp and a female arrived at the 
apartment in the early hours of June 13. Id., pg. 785, In. 4-24. 
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Mr. Tapp's girlfriend, Ashli Washburn, testified that she called Mr. Tapp about 8:00 a.m. 
on June 13, 1996, to see ifhe had gone to work. When Mr. Tapp answered the call, she knew he 
had missed work and simply hung up the telephone. She then decided "to go over to the 
apartment and yell at him." Id, pg. 1458, ln. 17 - pg. 1459, ln. 22. She arrived at about 9:30-
10:00 a.m. When she arrived, Mr. Tapp answered the door and Britney Morgan was inside the 
apartment. Id, pg. 1460, ln. 8 - pg. 1461, ln. 18. Mr. Tapp admitted to Ms. Washburn that Ms. 
Morgan had spent the night of the 12th-13 th with him at the apartment. Id, pg. 1462, ln. 2-15. 
Ms. Washburn was sure that it was June 13, because the day before had been their anniversary. 
Id, pg. 1464, ln. 2-14. 
Here, there is no evidence to support the district court's finding because, as set forth 
above, alibi was the defense at trial and evidence was presented in support of that defense. Thus, 
this Court should reject the district court's finding and vacate the partial summary dismissal 
made due to the unsupported finding of fact. Id. 
E. The Court Erred in Concluding That The Violation of Mr. Tapp's Right to Testify Was 
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Finally, the court concluded that Mr. Tapp's alibi evidence, by itself, would not have 
changed the verdict at the criminal trial, CR 132, and also dismissed the claim that Mr. Tapp's 
testimony about the circumstances of his statements to the police could have made a difference at 
trial. 
Turning to the additional evidence relating to the circumstance of the January 29, 
1997 interrogations, the Court is again in a position to compare that evidence with 
the evidence actually received by the jury in the criminal trial. ... The jury at the 
time of the trial also received additional evidence that corroborated Tapp's 
involvement in the crime. In considering the evidence heard by the jury and the 
testimony now proffered by Tapp, this court concludes that there is no reasonable 
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doubt that had Tapp testified at the time of trial, such testimony would not have 
altered the jury's conclusion as to guilt. 
LCR pg. 132. An examination of the evidence, however, shows that both of these conclusions 
are in error. 
1. Standard of review 
When the district court assumed for the purposes of the motion for summary disposition 
that Mr. Tapp was deprived of his right to testify, the burden shifted to the state to prove the error 
was harmless. For example, the Court of Appeals noted in Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 
274 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (2012): 
However, if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the context of 
deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has 
the burden to show he or she was deprived of the right to testify, and the state 
must then convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction-that it was harmless 
error. 
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704,274 P.3d at 5 (emphasis added). Here, the court erred in 
determining that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It appears that there is no Idaho case setting forth the standard of review of a trial court's 
determination of harmless error. However, if the question is one oflaw, the standard is free 
review because this Court reviews questions oflaw de nova. State v. Larios, 125 Idaho 727, 728, 
874 P.2d 538, 539 (1994). If the determination is a mixed question of fact and law, the standard 
of review is still de novo. "Because mixed questions of fact and law are primarily questions of 
law, we review them de nova." The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 69, 936 P.2d 1309, 
24 
1311 (1997). 7 
2. The exclusion of the alibi evidence and the evidence of the circumstances of the 
January 29 interrogation was not harmless 
As shown below, the violation of Mr. Tapp's right to testify was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. 
(a) evidence at trial 
The state's case against Mr. Tapp was not a strong one, as the Court of Appeals noted, 
"[t]he State's case was based almost entirely upon Tapp's confessions to having helped other 
men rape and murder Dodge; no physical evidence linked Tapp to the crime." State v. Tapp, 136 
Idaho at 358, 33 P.3d at 832. The district court, however, stated (without giving specific 
examples or citations to the record) that the jury at the time of trial heard evidence which 
"corroborated [Mr.] Tapp's involvement." CR 132.8 And, during the original post-conviction 
proceedings, the Court of Appeals noted that: 
7 The New York Court of Appeals has held the question of whether a trial error is 
harmless is one oflaw. People v. Reddick, 482 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1985). Several 
Courts have found that the determination of whether an error is harmless is a mixed question of 
fact and law. See e.g., Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336, 1339 & n.4(11 th Cir. 1993) (As 
"[h ]armless error is a mixed question oflaw and fact subject to de novo review," the Circuit 
Court found that "we are not bound by the Florida Supreme Court's determination on state 
postconviction review that Due st' s ... claim was harmless"); Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F .2d 
1426, 1432 (8th Cir.1993); see also Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1372 & n. 34 (5th Cir.1993) 
(collecting authorities); Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The district 
court's determination that the unconstitutional instruction was harmless is a mixed question of 
law and fact. We review this question de novo. Once a defendant has established Sandstrom 
error, the burden is on the State to establish that the error was harmless.") 
8 Given the district court's lack of familiarity with the criminal trial record regarding the 
alibi evidence, one wonders what, if any, corroborative evidence it had in mind when it made this 
statement. 
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the State provided other evidence which tended to corroborate the confession. 
The State called forensic experts to testify regarding how the crime was 
committed based upon the physical evidence. The crux of the State's case was 
that Tapp's confession provided accurate forensic details which the officers had 
not divulged to him prior to his confession. The officers testified about 
consistencies between Tapp's confession and the forensic evidence that the public 
did not know. J.S. testified that a month after the murders she overheard Hobbs 
tell a nervous Tapp to keep calm or he 'was going to blow his alibi.' D.O. 
testified that a few days after the murder she overheard Tapp say that he stabbed 
Dodge because she owed money for crank, he held her down while she was raped 
and killed, Hobbs slit her throat, and Tapp got blood on his shirt. J.B. lived with 
Tapp during the time of the murder and testified Tapp left the night of the murder 
wearing his favorite shirt and returned at 3:00 or 4:00 am without it and J.B. did 
not see the shirt again. F.E. testified that one day in June or July of 1996, Hobbs 
returned home with blood on his shoes. A.O. testified that one morning after the 
murder she saw Hobbs down by the river with his shirt slung over his shoulder 
and crying because Dodge had been killed. Other evidence showed this was 
before Dodge's murder had become public information. 
Tapp II, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 412, pg. 13. 
However, Mr. Tapp respectfully submits that the district court's unsupported assertion of 
corroborative evidence and the paragraph quoted above greatly overstate the strength of the 
state's case, especially in light of the defense alibi evidence. 
First, the Court of Appeals is correct that "the State called forensic experts to testify 
regarding how the crime was committed based upon the physical evidence." Id. And, certainly 
the state contended that "Tapp's confession provided accurate forensic details which the officers 
had not divulged to him prior to his confession." However, the officer's testimony about these 
alleged consistencies between Mr. Tapp's statements and the forensic evidence was vague. 
The state summarized its theory of the case with this question to the case detective: 
Q: How is it that as an investigator how is it that we as officers of the court, 
both the jury and those ofus here, can rely on what Chris Tapp tells us about what 
was committed, what was done at the scene of Angie's death, when he has told us 
Hobbs had sex with Angie, but there's no DNA there, his DNA doesn't show up, 
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his fingerprints don't show up? The question is essentially what Mr. Booker has 
been asking. Can you reflect on that for us? 
A: Yeah. The statements that were given all during this interview by Christopher 
Tapp, as far as what happened in the crime scene; how the crime was committed; 
again, the position of her clothing; where she was stabbed at; the tear marks in her 
shirt; where she was stabbed at; the tear marks in her skirt; description of how she 
was killed; that she was killed by a person; there's forensic evidence showing 
bruising on the right side of her face, consistent with somebody being hit, all these 
statements corroborate the facts that were at the scene itself. 
T (No. 25295), pg. 1347, In. 20 - pg. 1348, In. 13. As is obvious from the above, the detective's 
answer is long on generalities, but short on specifics. He does not say what Mr. Tapp said that 
was confirmed by "what happened at the crime scene," or "how the crime was committed," or 
"where she was stabbed at," or "by the position of her clothing," or by "[t]he tear marks in her 
skirt." 
Moreover, the detective is talking about all the statements by Mr. Tapp which were 
admitted at the trial. However, most of those statements should not be considered at this 
junction. The Court of Appeals held in Tapp I that all the interviews other than the one on 
January 29th were illegally obtained: "We hold that Tapp was not in custody on January 29, and 
therefore his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach and was not violated. Only Tapp's 
statements made on January 15, 17, 30, and 31 are suppressible for Fifth Amendment violations." 
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 363, 33 P.3d at 837. There is no indication in the record that the district 
court distinguished between the evidence actually admitted at trial and the evidence which would 
be admissible at a new trial. To the contrary, it is clear that the court considered all the evidence, 
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inadmissible and admissible, presented at the first trial. See CR 1329 
In addition, the specifics cited by the detective do not bear scrutiny. Obviously, the fact 
"that she was killed by a person" does not corroborate Mr. Tapp's statement that he was 
involved. Moreover, the transcript of the January 29 station house interview clearly shows that it 
was Detective Fuhriman who first suggested to Mr. Tapp how the "crime was committed," i.e., 
that Mr. Tapp held Angie down while the co-defendants stabbed her. 
FUHRIMAN: All right? Talkin' with, uh, the prosecutor, okay, this contract [the 
immunity agreement] is dissolved. 
TAPP: Yeah, okay. 
FUHRIMAN: Right now the way it looks you're goin' to jail and then prison. Okay? 
TAPP: He said I wasn't going to jail? 
FUHRIMAN: Not today. 
TAPP: Oh. 
FUHRIMAN: Okay. 'Cuz, 'cuz, he understands the medical things that's goin' on in 
your dads's life and, everything else. Like I say, he's a compassionate man, but ... 
TAPP: It still doesn't matter. 
FUHRIMAN: Yeah. Ya don't, ya don't screw with him, okay? So that's hanging over 
your head right now. Now, in talking to him, hypothetically, if CHRIS TAPP was holdin' 
onto Angie as she was being cut and if some other stuff was goin' on, or if CHRIS TAPP, 
took part in the knife in any way, shape or form, and cutting her, okay? 
9 The court wrote, "even if Tapp had testified at trial regarding an alibi, it is the 
conclusion of this Court when considering the record, there is no reasonable doubt that ... such 
testimony would not have altered the jury's conclusion as to his guilt." And, [t]uming to the 
additional evidence relating to the circumstances of the January 29, 1997 interrogations, the 
Court is again in a position to compare that evidence with the evidence actually received by the 
jury in the criminal trial. .. " Id. (Emphasis added.) 
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TAPP: But I didn't. 
FUHRIMAN: Would you listen? 
TAPP: Yes, sir. 
FUHRIMAN: Okay. Hypothetically, I said. 
TAPP: Okay. 
FUHRIMAN: So if CHRIS TAPP was involved in any way more than what you've told 
us, which it sounds like you possibly were, okay? To some degree. Okay? A contract 
could possibly c-, be constructed. 
TAPP: Right. But why would I pass the lie detector test, then, JARED? 
CR (#40197), pg. 196-197. It was not until after Detective Fuhriman told Mr. Tapp that he might 
be able to get his immunity agreement back ifhe admitted to holding Angie Dodge's arms down 
during the attack did Mr. Tapp make such an admission. Id, pg. 207 (report of Fuhriman of 
statements made at the Dodge apartment). Thus, Mr. Tapp's admission was not corroborated by 
the forensic evidence. Rather the detective manipulated Mr. Tapp into making an admission 
consistent with the forensic evidence by suggesting that the previous immunity agreement could 
be reinstated. 
Finally, while the detective said "there's forensic evidence showing bruising on the right 
side of her face, consistent with somebody being hit," a review of the testimony from the state's 
criminal investigator and the pathologist's testimony does not reveal that evidence. See T (No. 
25295), pg. 880, ln. 1 - pg. 968, ln. 23 (testimony of Leslie Stimpson and Gary Ellwein, 
M.D.).10 
10 Dr. Ellwein testified that there was a one inch bruise on the top of the right ear, which 
is certainly not the facial bruise testified to by the detective. Id, pg. 911, ln. 1 - pg. 912, ln. 24. 
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The non-forensic, non-confession evidence cited by the Court of Appeals is insubstantial. 
First, Jenna Shaw only testified that she overheard Mr. Tapp ask Ben Hobbs "[w]hat are 
we going to do, Ben?" T (25295), pg. 619, ln. 2-6. It was Ben Hobbs who used the word "alibi," 
not Mr. Tapp. Id, pg. 618, ln. 9-11. "Alibi" was not an unusual word for Hobbs to use because 
he was often in trouble with the law. Id, pg. 625 ln. 10-19; pg. 626, ln. 4-9. Further, Ms. Shaw 
was not a participant in the conversation and could not even testify as to its subject matter. Id, 
pg. 618, ln. 16-19; see also pg. 16-14 (Q: "Did you hear what the context was for this discussion 
about the alibi?" A: "No, I didn't."). Even though Ms. Shaw was eavesdropping on the 
conversation, both Hobbs and Mr. Tapp "acted like it was no big deal" when they realized she 
was listening to them. Their nonchalance about being overheard makes it seem unlikely they 
were secretly discussing a murder. Id, pg. 619, ln. 17-22. In addition, while the alleged 
conversation took place in July, Ms. Shaw did not report it to the police until October, even 
though she knew Angie Dodge and had seen Angie at the river on June 12, just a few hours prior 
to the murder. Id, pg. 604, ln. 11-16; pg. 611, ln. 16-23. On cross-examination, Ms. Shaw 
explained her delay in reporting by saying that she "had forgotten about the conversation" and 
admitted that she "was taking drugs back then." Id, pg. 627, ln. 16-23. 
Destiny Osborne also admitted her drug use had affected her ability to accurately perceive 
and relate events. She testified: 
I'm sure it does, because a lot of times I would black out, and so I wouldn't really 
remember what would happen or I wouldn't - it was kind of like a blank chip in 
my head. I don't -you know, it just kind of depended on how much drugs I did or 
Moreover, Dr. Ellwein did not testify the bruise on the ear was consistent with somebody being 
hit. 
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how much I drank, or like ifl combined all the drugs or just different things. 
Id, pg. 721, ln. 5-11. Just three months prior to her testimony, Osborne had been released from 
15 months of drug treatment at the Port of Hope and the Behavioral Health Center. Id, pg. 719, 
ln. 5-11. (The BHC is a secured facility housing juveniles. Id, pg. 755, ln. 7-23. She was sent 
there after a probation violation. Id, pg. 775, ln. 3-13.) She admitted that she had abused drugs 
for "a good three of four years" prior to entering treatment and she "used daily, every day," 
although she did not know if that qualified as a "severe" drug problem. Id, pg. 719, ln. 1-24. 
She was high on drugs when she overheard Mr. Tapp's alleged statements, although she claimed 
that those drugs "probably" did not affect her recollection of the conversation. Id, pg. 728, ln. 18 
- 22. She explained that: 
once you do so many drugs your body like gets immune to them .... I could take 
so many, you know, to a point where, hey, you know, maybe I shouldn't do 
anymore. So I wasn't to the point to where I couldn't focus, or I couldn't see, or 
my eyes were blurry. You know, I could still kind of hear things with the loud 
music and realize, yeah, it is pretty loud and I am pretty high or whatever. 
Id, pg. 728, ln. 24 - pg. 729, ln. 13. On cross-examination, Ms. Osborne admitted she was using 
marijuana every day around the time of Angie's death and used at least an ounce per day. She 
would also use methamphetamine and cocaine, but less frequently. Id, pg. 770, ln. 9 - pg. 771, 
ln. 25. Overall, however, "it was fair to say" that she was high "most of the time during June of 
1996[.]" Id, pg. 777, ln. 1-3. 
Like Jenna Shaw, Destiny Osborne did not report this alleged conversation to the police, 
even though she was a friend of Angie Dodge and the conversation occurred only "a few days" 
after Angie Dodge's death. Id, pg. 740, ln. 22 -pg. 741, ln. 8; pg. 747, ln. 13-17. She also did 
not tell her parents or any of her friends, as might be expected from a 16-year-old. Id, pg. 752, 
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ln. 14-18. She not tell the police about the alleged conversation until the detectives came to visit 
her at the BHC sometime during the year preceding the trial. Id, pg. 754, ln. 17-25. It is telling 
that no one else at the party reported this conversation to the police or corroborated Ms. 
Osborne's testimony at trial, even though she claimed four other people heard Mr. Tapp make the 
admission. Id, pg. 750, ln. 9 - pg. 751, ln. 9. (Q: "So there were five people who were supposed 
to have heard this conversation?" A: "Yes."). Finally, the evidence showed that Ms. Osborne 
had bad feelings toward Mr. Tapp. In fact, she had gotten into a verbal argument with Mr. Tapp 
during which she threatened to cut off his penis with a knife. Id, pg. 725, ln. 6-19. 
Fred Ehlert did not testify that Hobbs once came home with blood on his shoes. He 
testified that "believe[ d]" that Hobbs returned home with some "stains" on his shoes and there 
was a conversation about the origin of those stains possibly involving Hobbs's pets. Id, pg. 803, 
In. 2-17. Ehlert also testified that he was housed with Mr. Tapp at the Bonneville County Jail, 
but Mr. Tapp never made any admissions to him about the murder. Id, pg. 804, ln. 7-10. 
Audra Owens's testimony that she saw Hobbs crying because Angie had been killed does 
not incriminate Mr. Tapp in any way. However, it does tend to discredit Destiny Osborne's 
testimony that Hobbs and Tapp were laughing and bragging about killing Angie only two or three 
days later. 
Finally, while Jeff Blackburn testified Mr. Tapp left the night of the murder wearing his 
favorite shirt and returned at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. without it, he did not testify that he never saw that 
shirt again. What he said was that he did not know whether he saw it again. (Q: "Did you ever 
see that shirt again?" A: "Not that I remember. I don't think I ever saw that shirt again." Id, pg. 
786, ln. 1-5.) Mr. Blackburn also testified about the verbal fight between Destiny Osborne and 
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Mr. Tapp recalling that "Destiny went to get a knife to cut it [Mr. Tapp's penis] off." Id, pg. 787, 
ln. 10-16. However, the important part of his testimony was that Mr. Tapp returned to their 
apartment during the early morning hours of June 13, 1996, "drunk as a skunk" and that he 
"came in with this redheaded girl." Id, pg. 785, ln. 4-24. The redheaded girl was Britney 
Morgan. Thus, this part of Mr. Blackburn's testimony corroborated Mr. Tapp's alibi defense. 
In sum, the state's evidence against Mr. Tapp, excluding the one interview found to be 
admissible by the Court of Appeals, was not strong and Mr. Tapp had an alibi defense. More 
important, the burden is on the state to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Chapman v. California, supra. As will be shown below, it cannot be said that the state's 
evidence was so strong that Mr. Tapp's testimony could not have changed the verdict. 
(b) Mr. Tapp's testimony about January 29 and its effect 
In fact, it is likely the jury would have acquitted Mr. Tapp if had it heard his testimony 
about the circumstances of the January 29 statements. Mr. Tapp in his Affidavit in Support of 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleged that he "requested to take the stand in [his] own 
defense, so [he] could explain to the jury as to how Sgt. Fuhriman and Detective Finn threatened 
[him], and coerced [him] into a confession in this crime, and [to] explain the events concerning 
this crime." Exhibit in# 35536. The statements made on this day are central to the state's case 
because this is when Mr. Tapp went to the crime scene and admitted that he held the victim's 
arms and shoulders down during the crimes. These statements were found to be admissible by 
the Court of Appeals. Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 358, 33 P.3d at 832. 
If Mr. Tapp had been able to exercise his right to testify, he would have told the jury 
many things which were not on the videotapes shown to the jury. In particular, he could have 
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described how the facts of the interrogation affected him and about conversations which took 
place off camera. Based on that testimony, the jury could have concluded that Mr. Tapp had 
made a false confession. 
In particular, Mr. Tapp could have testified to all the facts and circumstances of January 
29, that he testified to at the evidentiary hearing in CV-PC-2002-6009 (now on appeal as 
Supreme Court No. 40197). His testimony included: 11 
• That he was driven to the police station by his father on the morning of the 291\ 
and had not eaten anything when he arrived. T pg. 13, ln. 8-16. 
• That he met with his attorney, Kurt Taylor, who told him he needed to meet with 
Detective Fuhriman. T pg. 14, ln. 21-25. 
• That Kurt Taylor told him that the police were going to pull the immunity 
agreement with him. T pg. 16, ln. 1-7. 
• That prosecutor Kipp Manwaring told him the same thing. Mr. Manwaring was 
very mad at that time and spoke to him in a loud voice. T pg. 17, ln. 3-8. 
• That, at this point, he thought that he was going to jail because the agreement 
was void. T pg. 17, ln. 19-25. 
• That, after Mr. Manwaring left, Detective Fuhriman told him that they could still 
help him. T pg. 18, ln. 4-12. 
• That his attorneys were never with him during the interrogation on the 29th. T 
pg. 19, ln. 1 7-19. 
• That his attorney told him that the only way he could help himself was by 
cooperating with the police. T pg. 18, ln. 23-25. 
11 The district court resolved certain credibility issues against Mr. Tapp in that case. But 
that is not the inquiry here. The question here is not whether Mr. Tapp's testimony is believed by 
the district court, but whether the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Tapp's 
testimony would not have had an effect on the verdict. Thus, if Mr. Tapp's testimony could have 
raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the error cannot be deemed harmless. 
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• That in his mind he believed that he would not be allowed to go 
home if he did not talk to the police. T pg. 23, In. 6-9. 
• That anytime he left the interview room in the Law Enforcement Building, he 
was escorted by a police officer. T pg. 31, In. 12-18. 
• That Detective Fuhriman claimed to a compassionate man and expressed 
concern about Mr. Tapp' s father's health. T pg. 3 7, In. 16-19. 
• That he did not walk out of the interview room because he did not believe he 
would be able to, because Detective Fuhriman was blocking his way with his body 
and because he was scared. T pg. 38, In. 20-24. 
• After he was transferred to the polygraph room, Detective Finn asked him if 
being taken back to the crime scene might help him to remember. T pg. 45, In. 
11-14. 
• He did not want to go to the crime scene nor did he suggest doing so. T pg. 45, 
In. 15-17. 
• That he was left in the polygraph room and he believed the door was locked. T 
pg. 50, In. 2-6. 
• He was transported to the crime scene in the back seat of an unmarked police car 
and he believed that the door was locked. T pg. 52, In. 18 - pg. 53, In. 8. 
• That while going up the stairs to the upstairs apartment, one of the officers made 
a threatening comment to him to the effect of "that something should happen to 
me like it happened to Angie." T pg. 55, In. 1-6. 
• That comment frightened him and he knew that both officers had their side arms 
with them. T pg. 55, In. 7-10; pg. 57, In. 19-25. 
• That he was hungry and tired during the interrogation at the crime scene. T pg. 
58, In. 21 - pg. 59, In. 3. 
• After the police were done at the crime scene, the police officers escorted him 
out the apartment and drove him back to the LEB and placed him in an 
interrogation room. T pg. 59, In. 8-25. 
• He didn't leave the interrogation room because he didn't believe he had that 
option. T pg. 60, In. 1-4. 
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• When the police begin to interrogate again, he asked to leave, but was told they 
had "other stuff to do or that we've got to hammer this out first." He did not feel 
he was free to go after that. T pg. 64, ln. 12 - pg. 65, ln. 11. 
• After that, Detective Fuhriman continued to question him and moved closer to 
Mr. Tapp, which intimated him. T pg. 66, ln. 19-23. 
• That when the detective told him that he was "running out of options" he 
believed that he was going to jail. That frightened him and caused him to 
continue talking to the police. T pg. 67, ln. 7-17. 
• That during the interrogation he was "making up whatever they want to hear, 
whatever they want me to tell them. Whatever they want to hear is what I'm 
telling them." T pg. 68, ln. 6-12. 
This testimony, by itself, is sufficient to show the error is not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In addition, however, Mr. Tapp provided the district court with his affidavit 
stating that he would have also testified in support of the alibi defense which was presented at the 
criminal trial, i.e., that he was at a party at Jason Hope's house on June 12, 1996, left there at 
about 10:30-11 :00 p.m. with Britney Morgan and spent the night with her. CR 102. 
Moreover, Mr. Tapp could have supplemented his trial testimony with that of June 
Elizabeth Bloxhan-Nielsen. Ms. Bloxhan-Nielsen testified at the evidentiary hearing upon 
remand in CV-PC-2002-6009. She is an independent witness to what happened when Mr. Tapp 
and the police arrived at Angie Dodge's apartment on January 29, 1997. She testified that 
Detective Fuhriman, Mr. Tapp and another officer came to the apartment. She stayed in the 
apartment with them the entire time, about "20, 30 minutes." T (Evidentiary Hearing in #40197) 
pg. 327, In. 17 - pg. 328, In. 20. She observed Mr. Tapp's demeanor and described it, as 'just 
unbelievable. He had - all the color had drained out of his face and his eyes were like the size of 
silver dollars and he just he looked like a ghost or something." Transcript, pg. 329, In. 308. 
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She noticed the look "[ w ]hen we first opened the door" and she said "I will remember 'til the day 
I die the look on Chris's face." Transcript, pg. 33, ln 21-22; pg. 335, ln. 16-17. This would 
corroborate Mr. Tapp's testimony that it was not his idea to go to crime scene and that he felt 
frightened and trapped by the police. 
Further, Detective Finn partially corroborated Mr. Tapp's testimony about being 
threatened with physical harm by the police: 
Q. Did Detective Fuhriman at any time say anything to that effect while going up 
the stairs? 
A. Kind of yes, ... I remember Mayor Fuhriman laughingly say "You know, I 
guess we could take you out and shoot you" and all three of us laughed about the 
whole thing. 
T pg. 281, pg. 3-9. Whether or not the police thought this was a laughing matter, Mr. Tapp 
testified he took it very seriously. 
Mr. Tapp's subjective thoughts and fears could have been testified to as they are relevant 
to the question of whether the circumstances of the interrogation caused Mr. Tapp to confess 
falsely. The Utah Supreme Court has observed: 
It is beyond dispute that some people falsely confess to committing a crime that 
was never committed or was committed by someone else. See Richard A. Leo & 
Richard J. Ofshe, Criminal Law: The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological 
Interrogation, 88 J.Crim. L & Criminology 429, 432-33 & n. 10 (1998); Richard 
J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice 
and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U.L.Rev. 979, 983 (1997). Because "the 
experience of the courts, the police and the medical profession recounts a number 
of false confessions voluntarily made," Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 14 7, 153, 
75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954) ( citation omitted), "the doubt persists that ... the 
aberration or weakness of the accused under the strain of suspicion may tinge or 
warp the facts of the confession." Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90, 75 
S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954 ). This is particularly true with respect to those who 
have a mental disease or deficiency, "those who lack fluency in the language in 
which they confess," and those who fail to comprehend "the legal significance of 
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their actions and words." Mullen, supra, at 402 & n. 79. 
State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477,483 (Utah 2003). Thus, Mr. Tapp's testimony would have been 
highly significant at the trial. 
Further, Mr. Tapp has a constitutional right to present evidence to support his claim that 
the confession was false. 
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to 
present a complete defense. We break no new ground in observing that an 
essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. That 
opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude 
competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such 
evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any 
valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a 
defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive 
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (emphasis added, internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
In addition to presenting his own relevant evidence about why the confession was false, 
Mr. Tapp could have presented an expert to explain how police interrogation techniques can 
cause false confessions. Such expert testimony has been held admissible in many cases. For 
example in Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 770-74 (Ind. 2002), the trial court excluded the 
testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a psychologist called by the defense as an expert in the field of 
"social psychology of police interrogation and false confessions." Dr. Ofshe testified that there 
are "demonstrated cases of people confessing to crimes, being convicted, and subsequently being 
exonerated." Id. He also testified that the "mentally handicapped are more suggestible and more 
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likely to give a false confession, 12" stating that they are "easier to manipulate," less able to 
appreciate long-range consequences, easier to persuade to see the facts as asserted by the 
interrogator, and easier "to get to give both true and false confessions." Id. On appeal, Miller 
argued that even when a trial court determines a defendant's statement to be sufficiently 
voluntary for admission in evidence, the defendant may still dispute its voluntariness to the jury. 
The Indiana Court agreed, writing that "[ a ]I though the court has previously determined 
voluntariness in connection with the statement's admissibility, the jury may find that the 
statement was involuntarily given. If the jury makes such a determination, then it should give the 
statement no weight in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence." Id, quoting Morgan v. 
State, 648 N .E.2d 1164, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App.1995). The Court reversed the trial court, noting that 
"a trial court's determination that a defendant's statement was voluntary and admissible does not 
preclude the defense from challenging its weight and credibility" and further finding that it was 
error to exclude the proffered expert testimony. Id. See also, Boyer v. State, 825 So. 2d 418,420 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing because excluded testimony "went to the heart" of the 
defendant's defense of false confession); People v. Kogut, 806 N.Y.S.2d 366,372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2005) (holding that "the nature of Dr. Saul Kassin' s psychological studies on the voluntariness of 
confessions generally and the phenomenon of eliciting false confessions will be admissible at 
trial"); State v. Miller, 86 Wash. App. 1064 (1997) (Trial court abused its discretion by denying 
12 There is evidence that Mr. Tapp suffers from a mental deficiency as well. The Court 
had before it in Tapp II evidence of Mr. Tapp's grades, the Affidavit of Lisa Barini-Garcia, one 
of Mr. Tapp's original trial attorneys, Mr. Tapp's affidavit and the affidavit of psychologist Mark 
Corgaint, Ph.D. Evidence of this type, which was available at the time of the criminal trial, 
would have bolstered Mr. Tapp's testimony that the confession was false. 
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requested funding for expert testimony on false confessions). 
In short, Mr. Tapp could have testified that he made a false confession because he was 
isolated from others, kept against his will, harangued, manipulated, and threatened with prison 
and worse if he did not confess. He also could have testified that he was with Britney Morgan at 
the time of the murder. This is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt whether the error was 
harmless under Chapman. The district court erred in dismissing the claim on this basis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the district court's summary 
dismissal of the successive petition and remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this.2~""c(day of October, 2013. 
Attorney for Christopher Tapp 
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